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Abstract: Traditionally, the revealed literature on foreign direct investment and the environment 
has conceived the investment-environment nexus in terms of foreign investors exploiting weak 
environmental regulations and abundant natural resources in developing host countries. This paper 
provides a corrective to the literature’s focus on locational factors as determinants of foreign 
investors’ environmental strategies. Based on an excursion through various insights on the 
environmental strategies of foreign investors offered by transaction cost economics, the paper 
reaches the conclusion that internalization, not location, may be the more significant aspect of the 
investment-environment nexus.  
 
I. Introduction 
Since the mid eighties, a growing 
literature has taken interest in the 
environmental strategies of 
transnational corporations (TNCs), in 
particular as they affect developing host 
countries1. To the extend that this 
literature has been theoretically 
founded, it has drawn mainly on trade 
economics or dependency theory at the 
macro level and market power theory at 
the micro level. Conspicuously little 
attention has been devoted one of the 
leading paradigms within international 
business, transaction cost economics. 
This paper2 demonstrates that a series 
of tangible and highly relevant 
hypothesis and explanations regarding 
the environmental strategies of TNCs 
can be extracted from transaction cost 
economics.  
                                               
1 For reviews of that literature, see Chudnovsky et 
al, 1999; Zarsky, 1999; Hansen, 1998; Jaffe et al, 
1995; Dean, 1992; Leonard, 1988; Gladwin, 1987; 
Pearson, 1985. 
2 Valuable inputs have been received by Audun 
Ruud, Peter Wad and Henrik Schaumburg-Muller.  
II. Theories of international 
production 
If there is a dominant theoretical 
paradigm regarding economic 
globalization and the environment it is 
no doubt neoclassical trade economics. 
Based on the logic of comparative 
advantages, trade economics argues 
that environmental factor endowments 
such as abundant natural resources, 
high assimilative capacities and a social 
tolerance for pollution, furnish some 
countries - typically emerging economies 
and developing countries - with 
comparative advantages vis-a-vis those 
countries not holding such endowments 
(Walter, 1975; Pearson, 1985; Leonard, 
1988). Further, most trade economists 
will argue that an international division 
of labor based on such locational 
advantages will increase global welfare 
and ought to be encouraged (Walter, 
1975; Summers, 1992). Authors inspired 
by dependency theory will tend to make 
predictions very similar to those of trade 
economics, but will question the positive 
welfare implications (Amin, 1975; 
O’Connor, 1989; Daly, 1993).  
The predictions made by neoclassical 
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trade economics have been challenged 
empirically. A host of studies has 
concluded that there is very little 
evidence that environmental factor 
endowments affect trade patterns (Jaffe 
et al, 1995) nor investment patterns 
(UNCTC, 1992; Dean, 1992; Jaffe et al, 
1995; Hansen, 1998; Zarsky, 1999; 
Chudnovsky et al, 1999; Letchumanan 
et al, 2000). One reason for the lack of 
empirical corroboration is that 
neoclassical trade economics assumes 
away (or at best, pays lip service to) the 
fact that the current integration of 
economies is driven less by trade than 
by foreign direct investment (FDI) 
undertaken by TNCs. Because it holds 
no conception of FDI, trade economics 
largely fails to grasp environmental 
outcomes of globalization and ends out 
with predictions that only find 
confirmation in the twisted world of 
general equilibrium models.  
This problem is all the more conspicuous 
as, since the late, 1960s, an 
exceptionally vital literature on 
international production has advanced 
our understanding of the role of FDI in 
globalization enormously (Vernon, 1966; 
Kindelberger, 1969; Hymer, 1976; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; 
Dunning, 1988). Where trade economics 
more or less implicitly assumes that 
goods are exchanged effortlessly among 
independent buyers and sellers across 
borders, the literature on international 
production explicitly postulates that the 
transfer of many goods - in particular 
intermediate goods - take place outside 
the market, within the same enterprise 
(Dunning, 1988:2).  
One of the most pervasive and dynamic 
theories of international production is 
the ‘internalization theory’ (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1991), the 
international sibling of the transaction 
cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975). In the following we will present 
the transaction cost perspective and 
outline the kinds of insights that it offers 
in regard to understanding the 
environmental strategies of TNCs.   
III. The transaction cost 
perspective on international 
production 
Since the early eighties, the transaction 
cost perspective – sometimes referred to 
as the theory of market failure - has 
been exceptionally successful within 
business economics; so successful that it 
according to some has become the new 
orthodoxy within economics 
(Groenwegen, 1996) and according to 
others, a fully fledged scientific research 
programme (Knudsen, 1998). While it 
throughout the, 1990s has been 
forcefully challenged from competence/ 
knowledge and resource-based 
perspectives (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Madhok, 1998; Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996) it still holds a strong position 
within business economics, especially 
within applied theory (Foss, 2001). Let 
us examine in more detail the central 
propositions of the transaction cost 
perspective.    
a. The transaction cost 
perspective  
In line with neoclassical economics, 
transaction cost economics conceives 
economic agents as rational utility 
maximizes3. In that sense, transaction 
cost economics is an extension of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm (Dunning, 
2000: 36). However, contrary to 
neoclassical economics the structure of 
the market system and its 
accompanying institutions (or lack 
hereof) is seen as giving rise to 
inefficiencies. These inefficiencies can be 
described as transaction costs.    
Transaction cost can be defined as the 
                                               
3 There is some debate whether transaction cost 
economics should in fact have a rational utility 
maximizing assumption at its core. However, as 
argued by Williamson (1996:13), analytically 
‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1978) economists will opt for 
the utility maximizing assumption over the 
satisficing assumption as the latter add little to the 
conclusion and implies an analytical tool box that 
is ‘incomplete and very cumbersome’. 
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sum of information, enforcement and 
bargaining costs associated with a 
market transaction (Hennart, 1991: 83). 
The existence of transaction costs may 
render alternatives - in particular 
hierarchies - more efficient than market 
solutions. Typically, transaction cost 
economics identifies three factors 
affecting the trade-off between markets 
and hierarchies, namely 1. Uncertainty 
associated with transactions; 2. The 
frequency of transactions; and 3. The 
asset specificity of the transaction 
(Menard, 1996: 158)4.  
Because transaction costs associated 
with markets exist, it will in many 
instances be opportune for 
entrepreneurs to replace market 
transactions with hierarchies:   
"If it is very costly to measure the 
value of goods and services, and 
opportunities for bargaining and 
dishonesty are therefor high...the 
price system can be replaced by a 
mode of organization in which the 
buyers and sellers no longer profit 
from their ability to change the terms 
of trade in their favor but instead are 
rewarded for following directives of a 
central party.....Such a system of 
organization is called hierarchy" 
(Hennart, 1991: 84). 
Transaction cost economics is typically 
employed to explain how characteristics 
of transactions determine whether a 
firm (or a hybrid form) will replace 
market transactions. This is why 
transaction cost theory sometimes is 
referred to as ‘the economic theory of 
the firm’. However, the transaction cost 
logic can equally be applied to explain, 
how characteristics of a given 
transaction determines the internal 
nature and properties of formal 
                                               
4 The uncertainty can either be related to external 
factors such as suppliers, demand conditions or 
changes in the regulatory environment or internal 
factors such as those emanating from 
opportunistic behaviour or costs of maintaing 
hierachies (Menard, 1996: 158). Frequency of 
transactions may reduce the need for hierachical 
integration and guidance. Asset specificity may 
increase the dependence on e.g. specific 
employers (Menard, 1996: 159). 
organizations (Menard, 1996)5. 
Emphasizing this latter aspect, 
Williamson defines transaction costs as6 
‘the comparative costs of planning, 
adapting and monitoring task 
completion under alternative 
governance structures’ with a 
transaction defined as ‘a good or 
service transferred across a 
technological separable interface’. 
b. The transaction cost 
perspective and 
internationalization 
The common application of the 
transaction cost perspective is to explain 
the choice between markets and 
hierarchies in a national context. 
However, the transaction cost logic has 
also been successfully employed to 
explain why market failures will induce 
firms to create hierarchies across 
borders. Cross border hierarchies are 
typically associated with foreign direct 
investment (FDI), that is investment 
undertaken in a foreign activity with the 
aim of obtaining management control of 
that activity.  
In the neoclassical world of frictionless 
markets there are no market failures. 
Technology and know-how is assumed 
automatically transferred to where it is 
most profitable to put into use. If a 
foreign company possesses assets not 
available in the home market, these will 
be exploited through arms-length 
transactions such as exports, licensing 
or franchising. In this world, no capital 
mobility and thus foreign direct 
investment will exist.  
These ‘hard’ assumptions of 
international trade economics are 
fundamentally challenged by the 
transaction cost theory of international 
production, the so called ‘internalization 
                                               
5 While the former application of the transaction 
cost logic is widely accepted within micro-
economics, the latter is more controversial 
(Menard, 1996: 149). 
6 Cited from Menard (1996: 151) 
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Initial investment Entry mode Control mode
Autonomy
No 
investment/ 
divestment
FDI
Full 
ownership
Joint 
venture
Firm 
specific 
advantages
Hierachical
integrationNon-equity 
linkages
Transaction costs factors
Transaction costs and the investment project cycle 
perspective’. Thus, from the mid, 1970s, 
a generation of economists took interest 
in explaining the international 
integration of business activities from a 
transaction cost perspective (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1991; 
Cantwell, 1991) and from the late, 
1970s and early, 1980s and onwards, 
the internalization perspective emerged 
as the dominant explanation of the TNC 
(Kay, 1983). While the internalization 
perspective has been seriously 
challenged by more behavioral, 
evolutionary and resource-based models 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1998) it still holds a dominant 
position within the theory of FDI 
(Dunning, 2000)7.  
1. Explaining internationalization 
Essentially, the internalization 
perspective explains why firms prefer to 
organize production internationally 
instead of simply relying on arms-length 
markets. The point of departure is a 
puzzle raised by trade economics’ failure 
to address the issue of FDI: why do 
firms engage in international production 
instead of simply exploiting their 
advantages through exports or licenses? 
The answer provided by internalization 
theory is that endemic informational and 
transactional market failures make 
hierarchical integration either more 
profitable or the only option for 
exploiting those advantages.  
Typically, three distinct types of 
transactional market failures are 
identified as sources of cross border 
integration: 1. Those arising from risk 
and uncertainty; 2. Those stemming 
from the ability of firms to exploit 
economies of large-scale production in 
an imperfect market situation; 3. Those 
producing significant positive and 
                                               
7 The internalization perspective has found way to 
numerous integrative frameworks to explain FDI 
(see e.g. Caves, 1982 or Rugman, 1981). Most 
notably it is an essential element in John 
Dunning’s Eclectic Framework which has assumed 
an almost paradimatic position within the literature 
on international production (Dunning, 1988,, 
2000). 
negative externalities.  
These market failures are typically 
consolidated under different headings, 
e.g. to safeguard supplies, to ensure 
quality, to guarantee markets, to protect 
property rights, to allow price 
discrimination, to spread the costs of 
shared overhead, etc.  
The greater the perceived costs of 
transactional market failures, the more 
TNCs are likely to exploit their 
competitive advantages through 
international production rather than 
arms length transactions (Dunning, 
1988: 3).  
2. Internalization factors in different 
stages of the project cycle 
While the transaction cost logic usually 
is devoted the question whether or not a 
company chooses to undertake FDI, it 
can also explain the optimal control 
mode over a foreign activity at different 
stages in the investment project cycle: 
The decision as to undertake FDI or not 
is one stage (see e.g. Casson, 1987; 
Teece, 1986; Buckley, 1982; Hennart, 
1991), the decision as to the degree of 
control with the foreign investment 
(entry mode) is a second stage (see e.g. 
Meyer et al, 1998 or Anderson and 
Gatingnon, 19868), and the decision as 
                                               
8 According to Anderson and Gatingnon’s 
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to the deployment of resources for 
specific activities is a third stage 
(Hennart, 1991; Menard, 1996). At all 
three stages of the investment project 
cycle, TNCs face a choice between 
hierarchies (control) or markets and at 
all three stages, the costs of market 
transactions vis-a-vis hierarchic 
transactions constrain that choice. 
IV. Internalization and the 
environment 
It should by now be clear that the 
transaction cost logic offers some fairly 
plausible explanations, why firms 
organize certain international activities 
through hierarchies rather than markets. 
In the following we will explore to what 
extend this logic can be employed to 
analyze the environmental strategies of 
TNCs as well. First, we will examine the 
extent to which transaction costs related 
to the environment influence the 
decision as to invest or not. Second, we 
will examine how environment related 
transaction costs may affect the choice 
of entry mode. Third, we will examine 
how transaction costs related to the 
environment affect the control mode in 
regard to foreign subsidiaries.  
a. The decision to invest  
The decision as to invest or not may be 
affected by environmental factors in at 
least two ways: First, transaction costs 
may explain whether and when firms 
facing high environmental compliance 
cost opt for relocation of production 
through FDI, so called ‘industrial flight’ 
to ‘pollution havens’ (Leonard, 1988). 
Second, transaction cost factors may 
explain investment behavior by firms 
                                                           
framework, there are four variables, which 
determine the efficiency of various entry modes 
from a transaction-cost perspective namely: 1. 
How highly proprietary is the nature of the 
knowledge employed; 2 How well understood and 
structured is that knowledge; 3. How customised 
are the products to the end user; 4. How mature 
are those products.  
 
possessing environmental ownership 
advantages9. Here a distinction must be 
made between firms in the environment 
goods and service industry proper and 
firms where environmental 
competencies provide the firm with a 
competitive edge.   
1. Industrial flight to pollution havens 
Mainstream trade economics will predict 
that firms facing high environmental 
compliance costs in the home country 
will relocate production to locations with 
less environmental compliance costs 
(Leonard, 1988). However, while 
locational factors definitely influence the 
decision whether or not to relocate 
production, they cannot predict the 
mode of relocation. Thus, it must also 
be demonstrated that the gains from 
investment in a pollution haven out-
weights the gains from choosing 
alternative modes, e.g. licensing or out-
sourcing. Internalization theory predicts 
that alternatives to investment in most 
instances will be more efficient for firms 
contemplating environmentally 
motivated industrial flight. This due to 
the relatively small gains of relocation 
compared to the potentially very large 
transaction costs of investing in the 
pollution haven (Klavens et al, 1995; 
Hansen, 1998). Some of these 
transaction costs are related to the 
environment, e.g. costs of potential 
litigation and punitive action as 
environmental awareness in the 
pollution haven grow, or costs of 
consumer backlash in home countries. 
Consistent with the predictions of 
internalization theory, very little 
evidence of industrial flight to pollution 
havens has been produced in spite of 
very large research efforts (Jaffe et al, 
1995; Leonard, 1988; Zarsky, 1999; 
Hansen, 1998; Letchumanan, 2000).  
2. FDI in the environment goods and 
service industry 
In many instances, firms will be forced 
                                               
9 Ownership advantages are maybe more 
commonly known as ‘competitive advantages’. 
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to start up international production in 
order to effectively exploit their 
competitive (ownership specific) 
advantages in producing environmental 
goods and services. Theoretically, the 
reasoning behind such a strategy can be 
captured by the internalization 
perspective:    
The environmental goods and service 
industry produces products such as eco-
labeled products, organically produced 
food, recycling friendly packaging 
materials, pollution abatement 
technologies, or cleaner technologies, 
and services such as eco-tourism, 
environmental auditing and certification 
services and consultancy services. The 
demand for such products and services 
has virtually exploded in recent years; 
by, 1996, the market was approaching 
$500 Billion annually (OECD, 2000: 8). 
Evidently thirty years of environmental 
regulation in OECD countries has led to 
the emergence of a strong industry.  
The integration of less developed 
countries (LDCs) into the global 
economy causes demand for 
environmental protection to rise, partly 
due to growing environmental concerns 
in those markets, partly due to 
pressures (and sometimes direct support 
to environmental investment from OECD 
countries fearing eco-dumping (Krut, 
1999). This creates a rapidly growing 
market for environmental goods and 
services in LDCs; already today 25% of 
that market is in non-OECD countries 
(Bangshøj et al, 2001).   
It is highly probable that the private 
sector will play a pivotal role in the 
development of environmental 
protection in LDCs as capital shortages 
and capacity problems leave little 
alternative to private organization. This 
is evidenced by the rapid proliferation of 
so-called BOOT (Build, own, operate, 
transfer) arrangements in LDC 
environmental infrastructure projects 
(Larsen, 2001).  
The environment industry in OECD 
countries will naturally seek to exploit 
these vast market opportunities. To do 
this, foreign direct investment will 
frequently be indispensable. This for 
three reasons that all have to do with 
transaction costs: First, it may not be 
possible for foreign firms to service the 
host market through arms-length 
transactions due to tariffs, technical 
barriers to trade or public procurement 
policies. While tariffs in the environment 
industry generally are low within the 
OECD (6-11%), they may be quite high 
in LDCs; in the case of India, it is up to 
100% (OECD, 2000:30). Technical 
barriers may be an even stronger force 
behind direct investment. Thus, a 
particular characteristic of the 
environment goods and service industry 
is that the market is driven largely by 
national regulation that often will work 
as technical barriers to trade (OECD, 
2000:32). Differences in standards 
prevent firms from capturing economies-
of-scale and different enforcement 
processes create potential costs, delays 
and uncertainties that is a major barrier 
to entry. Add to this, the typical national 
preference in most government's public 
procurement policies. These regulatory 
and political  barriers to trade provide a 
strong incentive for firms to undertake 
direct investment aimed at 
circumventing those barriers. Such 
investments typically take the form of 
M&As or joint ventures involving local 
firms.  
A second transaction cost related 
explanation, why the environment 
industry may prefer direct investment to 
arms-length transactions is that many 
LDC host countries offer little or no 
patent protection. Thereby there is a 
danger that local operators may copy 
the environmental technology possessed 
by the TNC10.  
                                               
10 However, as argued by the OECD (2000) the 
risks associated with lax patent protection does 
not seem to be a major problem in the 
environment industry. Thus, while propriety 
concerns in rare instances may affect investment 
patterns in the environment industry, the overall 
impression is that, as stated by the OECD, ‘in 
practice ….. the environment industry has not ……. 
identified intellectual property protection as a 
high-ranking problem. Nor does it seem to be 
subject to the problem of large scale piracy 
reported for some other goods’ (OECD,, 2000).  
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A third explanation why servicing host 
markets with environmental goods and 
services may require direct investment is 
that environmental know-how and 
know-why often is tacit and embedded 
in a larger organization and therefor is 
difficult to codify and exploit though 
arms-length transactions. In many 
cases, sellers must be able to apply 
generally available knowledge to the 
specific situation of the client, a skill that 
is very hard to formalize and codify. 
Moreover, the sale of environmental 
goods is typically part of a larger 
package including technical assistance 
and services. This ‘package nature’ of 
environmental goods makes them very 
difficult to sell without having a physical 
presence in the host market. 
3. Firms possessing complementary 
environmental competencies 
In an economy increasingly screening 
firms for their environmental profile and 
record, the possession of environmental 
competencies may provide firms with a 
competitive edge. Often such 
environmental competencies are tacit, 
highly informal and embedded in 
corporate culture and therefor difficult to 
organize through arms-length 
transactions. Consequently, 
environmental factors may strengthen 
the incentive to internalize production 
across borders, that is to undertake 
direct investment.   
There is in fact empirical evidence that 
environmental competencies have 
provided some firms with a competitive 
edge over other investors in regard to 
government contracts, concessions and 
procurement. Especially industries that 
potentially are extremely destructive - 
such as the mining industry or the oil 
industry - need to provide significant 
and very costly environmental 
safeguards in order to win contracts and 
concessions and thus be allowed to 
undertake investment (Clark, 1993). In 
many cases, such safeguards can only 
adequately provided by very large 
international firms11. In addition to 
government pressures, environmental 
screening by large industrial customers 
in buyer and producer driven commodity 
chains (Gereffi, 1994) may provide those 
foreign investors possessing special 
environmental competencies with an 
edge. Ultimately, leading TNCs  may - as 
seen e.g. in the car industry - supplant 
entire value chains to foreign locations, 
bringing with them the home market 
suppliers and subcontractors. This is 
done mainly to ensure quality and 
reliability of deliveries, but it is possible 
that known suppliers and subcontractors 
are provided with an additional edge 
because they are better able to provide 
environmental safeguards than are local 
firms. 
b. The choice of entry mode 
Just as transaction cost perspective can 
help us explain how environmental 
factors influence the investment 
decision, so may transaction cost theory 
explain how the choice of entry mode 
can be affected by environmental 
factors.  
In general, proprietary, reputational and 
scale considerations may draw in the 
direction of full ownership, whereas 
costs of obtaining approvals and permits 
or gaining market knowledge and 
circumventing cultural barriers may 
draw in the direction of joint ventures 
(Meyer et al, 1998). As OECD based 
TNCs, due to domestic pressures, often 
will harbor greater environmental 
concerns  than will the typical local 
partner in a LDC, it is probable that 
conflict on this issue may arise. The 
greater the discrepancy between the 
environmental outlook of the foreign 
firm and the local industry is in this 
regard, the more inclined the foreign 
investor will be to increase ownership 
                                               
11 In line with this, Hansen (1997) identifies Danish 
investment projects within the Eastern European 
telecom sector that were approved by host 
governments, partly because the Danish investors 
could document a capability to effectively address 
environmental problems. 
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control to prevent such conflict to arise.  
There is in fact evidence that OECD 
based TNCs in Eastern Europe have 
experienced conflicts with local partners 
in regard prioritizing environmental 
investment (Hansen, 1997) and similar 
evidence exists from Asian developing 
countries (Hansen, 2002). Such conflicts 
may increase the risks associated with 
joint ventures and help explain why 
TNCs in environmentally sensitive 
industries such as the chemical industry 
today prefer full ownership control when 
they invest in developing countries12. 
For instance, Ruud (1999) reports that a 
Norwegian chemical TNC increased its 
equity share due to concerns regarding 
the local partner’s environmental 
commitment.  
c. Organizing environmental 
management across borders 
As argued in the previous sections, 
transaction cost economics may help us 
understand various organizational 
modes between the two extremes of 
hierarchy and markets. In other words, 
internalization is not a one for all 
decision, but may be conceived as a 
continuum spanning from loose control 
(close to arms-length transactions) to 
highly hierarchical integration. In the 
following we will analyze, how 
transaction costs may influence the level 
of integration of a TNC’s environmental 
management system. It will be argued 
that the level of integration of foreign 
affiliates’ environmental function is 
affected by transaction cost factors in 
essentially three ways: First, a given 
operation may require various 
environmental services to be provided 
effectively and safely. However, if such 
services cannot be provided in the host 
market at reasonable costs, the TNC 
may opt for organizing that service 
internally. Second, opportunistic 
                                               
12 According to some observers, the joint venture 
nature of the Union Carbide Bhopal plant was a 
strong contributing factor to the, 1984 catastrophy 
(Gladwin, 1987b).  
behavior among regulators and other 
market agents creates environmental 
risks and uncertainties that may force a 
firm to strengthen control with affiliates. 
Third, the transaction costs associated 
with managing different standards in 
different locations may encourage TNCs 
to standardize their environmental 
management systems internationally.  
1. Organizing non-existent markets for 
environmental services 
The provision of environmental quality 
may be conceived as a business service 
similar to other services such as 
accounting or human resource 
management. Whether or not a firm 
chose to organize this service internally 
or not is affected by transactional costs. 
In industries where the production 
and/or marketing of a product requires a 
substantial input of environmental 
services and where those services 
cannot easily by acquired in the host 
country, there may be good reason to 
consider organizing that activity 
internally. The chemical industry for 
instance, often demands extremely 
sophisticated and expensive 
environmental services in order to be 
operated safely. These services are 
related to safety and storage, 
monitoring and controls or to treatment 
and disposal of waste materials. In 
many host countries it will be prohibitive 
expensive if not impossible to identify 
effective providers of such services, to 
screen them, and to ensure the quality 
of the services offered. Consequently, 
TNCs may be encouraged to organize 
those services internally. In line with 
this, a study of chemical TNCs in India 
found that some TNCs, in order to 
ensure a safe operation of their Indian 
affiliates were forced to undertake even 
very substantial investment to provide 
environmental services (e.g. incineration 
services) because such services were 
absent in the Indian market (Ruud, 
1999). 
2. Asset specificity and opportunism 
Two central determinants of cross 
border internalization are ‘asset 
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specificity’ and ‘opportunism’ 
(Groentwegen, 1996: Ch, 19). ‘Asset 
specificity’ refers to the ability of firms to 
bring a capital or investment made in 
connection with one market transaction 
to use in another market transaction. If 
asset specificity is high, the firm will be 
particularly vulnerable to opportunistic 
behavior among market agents and 
regulators. The existence of 
opportunism and asset specificity 
provide a strong incentive for TNCs to 
suspend the market and internalize the 
transaction13. In the following we will 
show how the concepts of asset 
specificity and opportunism can explain 
why some firms internalize 
environmentally sensitive activities:  
Reputational risks  
An important category of transaction 
cost considerations that may affect the 
environmental investment and control 
strategies of TNCs is ‘reputation’. This in 
at least three ways: 
First, a market solution - contracting out 
management of an environmental 
problem to a consultant firm or a local 
operator14 - may entail significant 
reputational risk for a TNC, not only for 
the affiliate but for the brand and 
company name world-wide15. The 
provider of the environmental service 
may cheat or be incapable of delivering 
on contractual obligations. Such risks 
provide an incentive to organize the 
production of that service internally.  
Second, TNCs may suffer reputational 
risks from the environmental 
performance of their suppliers and 
                                               
13 The classical case of an industry with very high 
asset specificity is the mining industry, where 
vertical integration is common to prevent 
opportunism from suppliers and customers 
(Wilkins, 1998). 
14 E.g. providing waste treatment facilities, 
providing engineering inputs, or conducting 
analysis of emissions. 
15 As noted by Gladwin (1987b), Union Carbide 
faced major problems locating activities anywhere 
near anyone in the years after the Bhophal 
catastrophy.  
subcontractors proper and consequently 
be encouraged to engage in upstream 
integration. This issue is for instance 
highly relevant within the food industry, 
where the growing use of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) has raised 
much concern, especially among 
European consumers. As a consequence 
of such market sentiments, producers of 
branded food products need to obtain 
firm guarantees from suppliers that raw 
materials are not GMOs, guarantees that 
ultimately may be acquired only through 
vertical integration. 
Finally, firms selling products and 
services that are environmentally 
sensitive may ultimately be encouraged 
to integrate the downstream marketing, 
sales and after-sales-service functions to 
avoid being associated with 
inappropriate marketing, use, storage 
and disposal of products. For instance, 
sellers of pharmaceutical products have 
to some extent integrated down stream 
activities for exactly such reasons. The 
sale of pesticides in developing countries 
provides another case where the 
reputational risks to a brand name have 
encouraged cross border integration, in 
this case down stream into marketing 
and sales (Eriksen and Hansen, 1999).  
Opportunistic behavior among regulators 
TNCs already engaged in foreign 
transactions with high asset specificity 
may be in a weak bargaining position 
when they negotiate environmental 
permits with local authorities. In such 
cases, TNCs may opt for high corporate 
environmental standards and stringent 
internal controls to shield them selves 
against costly or even rent seeking 
intervention by regulators. Internalizing 
standards and controls may prevent that 
the entire operation is put in jeopardy 
by arbitrary regulatory intervention. 
Industries characterized by high asset 
specificity - such as mining or chemicals 
- can alone for this reason be expected 
to operate with high environmental 
standards regardless of local regulatory 
requirements.   
Conversely, TNCs that have few assets 
vested in a given foreign transaction 
Foreign direct investment and the environment 
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How transaction costs may affect the international environmental strategies of TNCs  
 
Vertical integration strategy Horizontal integration strategy 
Upstream Downstream
¾ Firms possessing competitive advantages related 
to the environment that cannot be exploited 
through arms lenght transactions due to 
regulatory barriers, propriety concerns or because 
the advantage cannot be easily codified  
¾ Firms wishing to shield themselves against 
opportunistic behavior by other market agents or 
regulators   
¾ Firms fearing problems from lack of environmental 
commitment of host country joint venture partner  
¾ Firms (with brands) having a high environmental 
profile or visibility and thus facing significant 
reputational risks from opportunistic behaviour by 
potential licence or franchise holders  
¾ Firms seeking scale advantages related to 
environmental management and technology 
¾ Firms purchasing 
environmentally 
sensitive rawmaterials 
where it is difficult to 
control their 
environmental quality 
(e.g. genetically 
modified organisms, 
hormone beef or tropical 
wood) 
¾ Firms that require 
environmental services 
that cannot be provided 
satisfactoryby local 
markets (e.g. emission 
monitoring or  
environmental 
certification) 
¾ Firms selling products, the 
safe use of which requires 
huge training and education 
efforts (e.g. pharmaceuticals 
or pesticides)  
¾ Producers of intermediate 
technology that potentially is 
environmentally destructive 
and where reputation might 
suffer from abuse of that 
technology 
¾ Firms operating in host 
countries where there are 
widespread market failure 
for environmental waste 
management services 
may easier obtain concessions from 
regulators as they credibly can invoke 
the ‘exit’ option. In line with this, most 
cases of environmentally dubious 
behavior by TNCs are within highly 
footloose industries such as the furniture 
industry, the textile industry 
(Teknologirådet, 1999), or the shipping 
industry (Murphy and Oye, 1998).  
3. Reducing transaction costs of multiple 
governance systems 
Firms engaged in international activities 
spanning numerous jurisdictions may 
significantly reduce transaction costs by 
establishing common systems of 
governance. Instead of creating specific 
management procedures, standards, 
organizations etc. for individual 
operations in different countries, there is 
a strong pressure on TNCs to 
standardize approaches.  
This motive for cross border integration 
of activities is no more evident than in 
the environmental field. Thus, Royston 
(1979) explains that the "technical 
standards of the plants operated by 
multinationals in different countries tend 
to be similar, just because it is 
managerial simpler to standardize". 
Hadlock (1994) further explains that it 
would be impractical to design separate 
training curricula, personnel evaluation 
systems, audit and inspection protocols, 
risk reduction initiatives and standard 
environmental procedures for operations 
in distinct plants or countries and that 
TNCs therefor tend to create uniform 
management systems. Raucher (1997) 
argues that,  
"fixed and sunk cost may 
make it cheaper to use 
environmentally friendly 
technologies that have 
been developed for 
domestic plants elsewhere 
than to redesign them for 
laxer standards".  
It can furthermore be argued that in a 
dynamic perspective, the drive toward 
standardization is reinforced. Thus, 
market and policy driven convergence of 
environmental standards and 
requirements makes it increasingly 
profitable for TNCs to adopt uniform 
approaches globally as this provides first 
mover advantages (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995) and prevents costly 
retrofitting if regulation is strengthened. 
Consistent with the above observations, 
numerous studies indicate that 
standardized environmental 
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management approaches are a 
significant characteristic of TNC 
environmental strategies (Hadlock, 
1994; UNCTAD, 1993; Hansen, 1998; 
2002)16.  
d. Summary 
In Table I we have summarized the 
various ways that transaction costs and 
environmental factors interact to create 
cross border hierarchies. The table 
distinguishes between horizontal and 
vertical integration as well as backward 
and forward integration. As seen, many 
important aspects of the investment-
environment nexus can be understood 
when seen through the lenses of 
transaction cost economics. Thus, we 
have provided a corrective to the pre-
occupation with locational factors as a 
determinant of TNC environmental 
strategies that, thanks to the hegemonic 
position of trade economics, has tended 
to characterize the literature on FDI and 
the environment. Our conclusion is that 
internalization rather than location may 
be the more significant aspect of the 
investment-environment nexus.  
V. Environmental effects of 
FDI 
The internalization paradigm is mainly 
aimed at explaining international 
production and is as such a departure 
from trade economics, which typically 
assumes no capital mobility. However, it 
does not denounce its neoclassical 
heritage in regard to drawing welfare 
implications of FDI:  
a. Welfare effects of FDI 
In the world of transaction cost 
                                               
16 For instance, Hansen (1998) finds that there is a 
strong correlation between the multinational 
orientation of Danish TNCs and their level of 
environmental management centralization, a 
correlation that remains strong even when 
controlling for size and industry. 
economics, FDI is essentially about 
internalizing activities that due to 
endemic failures of markets in host 
countries cannot be organized 
otherwise. By combining mobile assets 
of TNCs with immobile assets of host 
countries, FDI introduces a series of 
tangible and intangible assets in host 
countries that would not otherwise have 
been available (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 
1994; Blomstrøm, 2000; Altenburg, 
2000). Consequently, internalization 
theory will tend to emphasize that TNCs 
impact host countries positively, partly 
because they make technology, capital 
and know how available that cannot be 
provided through arms-length 
transactions, partly because rivalry 
between global firms combined with the 
incentives to internalize failing markets 
lead to a more rapid diffusion of 
desirable technologies than if no 
internalization took place (Graham, 
1996: 40). Thus, in line with neoclassical 
trade economics, the internalization 
perspective argues that 
internationalization overall is welfare 
enhancing, however not only because of 
the efficient workings of the market, as 
argued by trade economics, but also 
because of the replacement of failing 
markets by TNCs (Hood and Young, 
1981).  
The internalization perspective also 
differs from the market power tradition 
on TNCs as originally outlined by the 
seminal work of Hymer in the early 
sixties (see also Barnett and Muller, 
1974; Caves, 1982; Cantwell, 1991). 
Market power theories  - and with them 
most sociologists and radical economists 
– will tend to explain cross border 
hierarchies in terms of power and 
conceive TNCs as instigators and 
creators of market imperfections (e.g. 
monopolies and oligopolies), 
imperfections that reduce welfare. In 
contrast, the internalization perspective 
views market failures as endemic, 
inherent in the workings of the market 
and FDI as an introduction of efficiency 
in such failing markets 17. 
                                               
17 In the words of Rugman (1981:33) ‘the 
multinational firm is able to circumvent most 
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b. Environmental effects of FDI 
It is very common in popular debates to 
depict TNCs as major culprits of 
environmental destruction, in particular 
in developing host countries. Typically 
these impacts are attributed to the 
market power of TNCs, their secrecy, 
and their ability to rapidly deploy 
resources to new uses and locations 
(Gladwin, 1987). A more moderate 
version holds that foreign investors in an 
environmental sense (and presumably in 
other ways as well) are no different 
from comparable local companies18. 
From a transaction cost economic 
perspective, these assertions are 
counter intuitive. First, according to the 
internalization perspective FDI creates 
greater efficiency in the workings of the 
market. As environmental protection and 
resource conservation are closely related 
to efficiency, the expectation is that, 
ceterus paribus, an inflow of FDI will 
lead to improved environmental 
conditions in developing host countries 
(Birdsal and Wheeler, 1992).  
Second, TNCs provide a significant 
technological and organizational bridge 
between countries (Hadlock, 1994). As 
FDI, according to the internalization 
theory, is about exploiting home bound 
advantages in foreign locations, and as 
environmental know how and 
technology often is embedded in the 
very organizational and technological 
fabric of the enterprise, FDI in 
environmentally backward countries will 
typically lead to a relative environmental 
upgrading. In fact, through various 
diffusion and spill over effects (Wallace, 
1996), the environmental effects of FDI 
may not only pertain to fully controlled 
subsidiaries but also to joint venture or 
                                                           
exogenous market imperfections. Concerns about 
the alledged market power are only valid when it 
is able to close markets or generate exogenous 
imperfections. In practice, these events rarely 
occur’.  
18 Thus, several authors have suggested that it is 
size, industry, etc. that explain environmental 
performance of firms, not the foreigness of 
ownership (Dasgupta, 1998; Jenkins, 1999). 
even non-equity partners.  
Third, because TNCs are large, 
internationally oriented and diversified, 
they can better handle short and 
medium term risks and maintain a 
longer investment horizon than other 
firms (Wilkins, 1998: 17). The 
environmental implication of this is that 
TNCs are more likely to undertake 
environmental investments that meet 
not only current regulatory standards, 
but also anticipate future environmental 
standards.  
c. Summary 
In sum, rather than focusing on export 
of polluting production and double 
standards, the transaction cost logic will 
emphasize how FDI may produce 
positive environmental effects in 
developing host countries. Ultimately, 
TNCs’ strive for reducing transaction 
cost related to the environment may, 
this perspective would tend to argue, 
spur an international convergence of 
environmental standards around the 
highest common denominator (Hadlock, 
1994; Wallace, 1996; Gentry, 1999); as 
stated by Dunning,  
TNCs ‘far from being exporters of 
pollution – as was once thought – ... 
are among the trail blazers of 
environmentally friendly, yet 
competitive enhancing innovations, 
and often set, rather than follow, the 
dictates of governments’ (Dunning, 
1997) 
VI. Externalization and the 
environment 
In the previous sections we analyzed, 
how the transaction cost logic may help 
explain why environmental factors may 
encourage TNCs to internalize across 
borders. A similar logic may be 
employed to analyze the decision as to 
divest a foreign activity. In the following 
we will turn to the environmental 
implications of such ‘externalization’.  
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a. Toward flexible international 
production 
Cross border integration of economic 
activity can be either equity or non-
equity based, deep or shallow. It is a 
widespread belief that economic 
globalization entails a movement from 
‘thin’ and ‘shallow’ integration (trade and 
portfolio investment based integration) 
toward ‘deep’ integration (FDI based 
integration) (Dicken, 1998). However, 
this is probably a simplified 
characterization of the current economic 
internationalization process. Rather, 
globalization may be conceived as an 
intensifying development of 
simultaneous cross border internalization 
and externalization processes (Kobrin, 
1997), processes that are largely 
orchestrated by TNCs. Developments in 
computer and information technology 
combined with falling transportation 
costs enable firms to organize 
production in new ways19. The result is a 
highly complex pattern of internalized 
and externalized transactions, markets, 
hierarchies and networks, molded 
together by the strategies of large TNCs.  
b. The transaction costs of 
hierarchies 
The dichotomy between different modes 
of organizing international production 
can be phrased in transaction cost 
terms: Thus, just as market transactions 
implies costs, so do internalized 
transactions (Coase, 1937). When an 
activity is internalized, the nature of the 
transaction changes fundamentally. The 
                                               
19 It has thus become common to describe the 
changes in the international organization of the 
economy in terms of movements toward post 
fordist production modes (Dicken, 1998). Post 
fordism entails a movement away from traditional 
mass production toward an emphasis on 
economies of scope, flexibility and just in time 
production. The expansion of post fordist modes of 
production makes it possible to slice up the value 
chain and source internationally non-vital parts of 
production while integrating those functions that 
yields the highest profits. 
 
internalized activity becomes guided by 
non-market signals such as directives 
voiced by superiors, company rules, and 
socialization into corporate culture. In 
essence, price constraints on employees 
are replaced by behavioral constraints 
(Hennart, 1991: 105). Such 
internalization implies costs, not only in 
terms of control and monitoring, but 
also in terms of stifling innovation or in 
terms of assuming liability. Thus, the 
advantages gained through reduced 
transaction cost of common governance 
must be balanced against the costs of 
coordination.  
According to the transaction cost logic, 
firms will continue to integrate activities 
across borders until the marginal 
transaction costs of hierarchies exceed 
the marginal transaction costs of 
markets. At this point activities will, 
depending on sunk costs and other 
slacks involved, be externalized, that is 
divestment will take place. As the 
relative costs of hierarchies and markets 
respectively are under constant change 
due to market volatility and rapid 
technological developments, the optimal 
configuration of hierarchies and markets 
may be altered within very short time 
spans. In line with this, the reason for 
the proliferation of international sourcing 
by TNCs could be that the relative costs 
of hierarchies vis-a-vis markets are 
being altered by technological 
developments, falling transportation 
costs and policy liberalization.  
c. Environmentally motivated 
externalization 
Focussing on environmental dimensions, 
it is evident how transaction costs 
factors make TNCs simultaneously 
contemplate externalization and 
internalization. In industries and firms 
where there are huge reputational risks 
at stake; where propriety know-how is 
firmly embedded in the environmental 
function; where gains of common 
governance are significant; or where 
asset specificity is high, a continuous 
integration of environmental aspects of 
foreign activities can be expected. This 
integration process will not only involve 
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fully controlled subsidiaries but 
increasingly also joint ventures and non-
equity partners.  
However, cross border environmental 
monitoring and controls are expensive 
and inflexible (Hansen, 1998; Hadlock, 
1994). Ultimately, the costs of 
sustaining high standards around the 
globe and running a worldwide 
environmental management system may 
motivate divestment and externalization:  
‘The administrative costs of 
hierarchies and/or external 
diseconomies (or disbenefits) of 
operating a foreign venture (e.g. as 
shown by the Bhopal disaster)’ may 
lean the TNC toward divestment 
(Dunning, 1988: 3).  
Especially firms operating in markets 
with narrow profit margins can be 
expected to opt for outsourcing of 
environmentally costly and risky 
activities. They will source for at least 
three reasons: 1. The growing costs of 
providing environmental goods and 
services worldwide might encourage 
firms to source whatever activities that 
are expendable; 2. The falling 
transaction costs of sourcing may 
further promote sourcing of polluting 
activities; 3. The proliferation of internal 
market thinking in TNCs (Birkingshaw, 
2000)20 may promote divestment of 
environmentally risky or costly activities.  
There is in fact evidence that some 
TNCs attempt to obtain quick returns on 
large-scale investment by externalizing 
as many functions and costs as possible 
(Carrere, 199921). In particular in labor 
intensive industries characterized by 
mature technologies (such as furniture, 
textiles or tanneries) a notable sourcing 
process appears to take place from 
OECD countries to LDCs. While there are 
many factors explaining this process - 
labor costs being the most prominent -    
environment, health and safety costs 
                                               
20 Birkingshaw (2000) makes a distinction between 
an internal and external market model to contrast 
the hierarchical model traditionally emphasised. 
21 Cited from Utting, 2000: 18. 
and risks may play a role as well 
(Hesselberg, 1992; Knutsen, 1995; 
Jenkins, 1999) As noted by one observer 
‘The logic of capitalist production ... 
puts pressure on firms to cut or 
externalize costs and seek locations 
with weaker environmental and labor 
regulations’. Such pressures may well 
be escalating in the harshly 
competitive environment associated 
with globalization and liberalization. 
Through mergers and acquisitions, 
downsizing, outsourcing, the 
feminization and informalization of 
employment, and the lure of largely 
deregulated havens such as export 
processing zones, many corporations 
are reducing their core labor force 
and shifting production to sites and 
systems with lower social and 
environmental standards’ (Utting, 
2000:18) 
Thus, the surprising conclusion 
regarding globalization and the 
environment may be that the danger 
seen from an environmentalist’s 
perspective comes not so much from the 
international expansion of hierarchies as 
typically argued by environmentalists, 
but rather from the dissolution of those 
same hierarchies. 
d.  Networks between markets 
and hierarchies 
Hitherto, this paper has phrased the 
strategic choice facing TNCs in terms of 
markets versus hierarchies. However, at 
least one additional organizational mode 
must be considered and that is 
‘networks’, or as it is sometimes referred 
to, ‘co-operation’, ‘collusion’, ‘linkages’ 
or ‘alliances’. Let us analyze 
environmental aspects of such modes in 
a transaction costs perspective: 
1. A network economic conception of 
internationalization 
In recent years, international business 
economists have argued that networks22 
                                               
22 According to Kobrin (2000: 152), a network is ‘a 
cooperative and reciprocal organization of 
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rather than markets and hierarchies are 
the defining mode of current 
internationalization (Hirst and Zeitlin, 
1991; Gerreffi et al, 1994; Kobrin, 1997; 
Lipsey, 1998; Dunning, 1997). It is 
argued that information technology, 
computerization, policy liberalization and 
falling transportation costs make it 
increasingly possible to organize cross 
border transactions through 
collaborative relationships. Given the 
costs and risks associated with 
developing and introducing new 
products it is increasingly necessary for 
firms to establish strategic alliances and 
other forms of collaborative relationships 
(Kobrin, 1997: 151). Others argue that 
the proliferation of network based 
activities is partly a result of the 
intensified competition in factor and final 
goods markets which leads companies 
to shed non-core activities into networks 
and alliances (Dunning, 1997). 
In sum, it is argued, network linkages 
are increasingly replacing market based 
or hierarchical linkages. In the words of 
Kobrin, the information revolution 
removes the boundaries between 
manufacturing and service industries 
and “facilitates the integration of 
geographically dispersed operations and 
allow networked coordination to replace 
ownership and hierarchy as the primary 
mode of control” (Cited from Hood and 
Young, 2000: 396).  
From a transaction cost perspective, 
network based organization embodies 
several advantages vis-a-vis the 
hierarchical and market alternatives. It 
maintains the advantages of markets 
(low entry and exit costs, low control 
costs) while assuming some of the 
advantages of hierarchies (coordination 
and information sharing). Those 
advantages are particularly beneficial in 
situations where innovation and 
development are crucial.  
However, while it is true that the altered 
competitive environment may offer new 
opportunities for non-market, non-
                                                           
economic transactions’ in which the most 
important flows are knowledge and information. 
hierarchical organizational modes, it is 
also true that networks entail costs that 
may transcend those of either markets 
or hierarchies. These are the well-known 
costs associated with collective action, 
including asymmetric information (which 
gives rise to uncertainty regarding the 
real value of goods being offered); 
moral hazard (that participants in a 
network are less careful due to mutual 
insurance and shared responsibilities); 
or outright deception and irresponsibility 
(e.g. that some participants enter the 
network with no intention or ability to 
fulfilling its obligations).  
2. Environmental implications of 
networks 
There are various reasons why 
especially environmental activities are 
particularly likely to become subject to 
network cooperation. First, as TNCs 
increasingly are shedding non-core 
activities due to intensified competition, 
environmental activities are likely to be 
subject to network cooperation as these 
activities rarely are core activities. 
Second, the environment is a relatively 
new issue on the corporate agenda and 
firms are still in the process of finding 
appropriate ways to address such 
issues, especially when we focus on 
international environmental problems. In 
this situation of development, innovation 
and search for appropriate responses, 
network collaboration is effective.       
Given these advantages of network 
collaboration in the environmental field, 
it is not surprising firms increasingly are 
collaborating to solve environmental 
problems in a non-competitive manner. 
Through technical collaboration23, the 
formation of professional networks and 
environmental industry associations24, 
an industry may achieve significant 
environmental progress at relatively 
modest costs. By issuing common 
                                               
23 For examples, see e.g. Andersen (1999) or 
Flotow (2000). 
24 E.g. WBCSD, ICC, INEM, CMA.  
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environmental standards and criteria25 
or setting benchmarks for environmental 
performance26, the transaction costs of 
identifying appropriate standards and 
behavior in uncharted waters are 
significantly reduced. More sinister 
observers would argue that such 
collaboration is mainly undertaken to 
deflect costly government intervention 
(Gleckman, 1992; Finger et al, 1997).  
It has been argued that network based 
and flexible production is conducive of 
environmental and social responsibility 
(Utting, 2000: 24). First, flexibility and 
innovation is central to competitiveness 
in a network-based economy and such 
objectives are consistent with high 
environmental performance (Porter et 
al, 1995). Second, new technology is 
frequently also clean technology and 
close network based integration may 
lead to massive technology transfer and 
diffusion. Third, network based 
production builds to a large extend on 
cooperation and trust. The search for 
‘trust’ has, it could be argued, prompted 
the widespread environmental 
certification and reporting activities 
currently taking place in TNCs.  
e. Summary 
In this section we analyzed hierarchies, 
markets and networks as alternative 
ways of organizing environmental 
activities across borders. The choice 
between these three alternative modes 
can be analyzed through the lenses of 
transaction cost economics. Thus, the 
transaction costs of hierarchies, markets 
and networks respectively can explain 
many aspects of TNC environmental 
strategies. Roughly, transaction cost 
economics predicts three generic 
environmental strategies: First, there is 
                                               
25 Examples are the chemical industry’s 
Responsible Care Programme, the Pharmaseducial 
industry’s Good Manufacturing Practice, the ISO 
14000 series environmental management 
standards, or the ICC Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development 
26 As it is done in ICC (1992) and BCSD (1992). 
the externalization strategy where 
environmentally costly activities are out-
sourced or abandoned entirely. This 
strategy can be expected from firms 
producing highly price elastic, 
standardized goods that are sold in spot 
markets or in anonymous consumer 
markets. Such firms will be prone to 
dynamics of industrial flight to pollution 
havens and there are good reasons to 
be concerned about the environmental 
implications of their activity. Second, 
there is the internalization strategy 
where advanced industries with 
activities embedding a high level of tacit 
environmental knowledge and with a 
long-term investment horizon seek to 
protect and exploit environmental assets 
and to avoid environment related risks. 
In such cases there are good reasons to 
expect significant positive environmental 
spill over effects from TNC activity. 
Third, there are cases where neither the 
externalization nor the internalization 
strategy will create a satisfactory 
balance between environmental 
protection and competitiveness. In such 
cases, a network strategy may provide a 
solution to the apparent stark choice 
between markets and hierarchies. 
VII. Conclusion 
Traditionally, trade economics, 
dependency theory and market power 
theory alike have emphasized locational 
factors when explaining the 
environmental strategies of TNCs. 
Consequently, the literature has been 
phrased largely in terms of ‘industrial 
flight’ to ‘pollution havens’ and 
‘environmental double standards’. 
However, there are strong forces 
countervailing the disintegrative forces 
of industrial flight and double standards, 
forces that are rarely captured by the 
above-mentioned theoretical paradigms. 
This essay argued that the balance 
between integrative and disintegrative 
forces affecting TNC environmental 
strategies may be captured by the 
transaction cost perspective. Sometimes 
transaction costs will push in the 
direction of hierarchical integration, e.g. 
because scale advantages from common 
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governance reduce costs, because 
market solutions are infeasible or risky, 
or because the intangible nature of 
environmental assets makes it 
impossible to exploit them through arms 
length transactions. In other instances, 
transaction cost considerations press 
TNCs toward externalization of 
environmentally sensitive activities.  
It is probable that the significance of 
environmental transaction costs may 
gain in importance as concerns 
regarding environmental and ethical 
aspects of international production are 
mounting. This may significantly 
influence TNC strategies, not only in 
regard to how they organize their 
environmental management systems, 
but also in regard to the very decision as 
to engage in international production or 
not. In deed, one of the most interesting 
strategic issues for international 
business in the coming decade may be 
how to identify the optimal configuration 
for managing the environment across 
borders.  
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